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The Respondent, the Utah State Tax Commission, pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitions for 
rehearing of the Opinion filed March 7, 1995 in the above-
captioned matter. The Respondent asserts that the Court has 
overlooked three critical elements in its legal analysis: 
I. THIS COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A. This Court Did Not Complete An Analysis Of The 
Standard Of Review. 
On page four of the opinion, it correctly concludes that, 
"Where the Commission has been granted discretion to interpret a 
term in a statute, its decision will not be overturned unless it 
is unreasonable. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 
592 (Utah 1991)." However, the Court leaves the standard of 
review discussion, and immediately focuses on an agency rule by 
saying, "Regardless of our standard of review and the amount of 
discretion we are required to accord to the agency's 
interpretation of statutory terms, we will set aside an agency 
rule that is inconsistent with its governing statutes." The 
Court fails to recognize that it must still apply the statutory 
language even in the absence of the Commission rule. Therefore, 
shifting focus to the rule does not obviate the need to identify 
and apply the proper standard of review. 
1 
On one previous occasion, this Court addressed section 59-
12-104(16)1 Mt. Olvmpus Waters v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271 
(Utah App. 1994). On pp. 1274-1275, the Court in dicta states, 
"the statute in question contains no explicit grant of discretion 
to the Commission, . . . " That statement is not correct. The 
clear language of the statute contains two express grants of 
discretion to the Tax Commission: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah; 
(a) manufacturing facility means an 
establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 to 
3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual, of the federal 
Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget; 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the 
commission shall by rule define "new or 
expanding operations" and "establishment"? 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). (Emphasis added.) 
1
 In the Mt. Olvmpus case, the updated supplemented 
paragraph numbers were used. Although the language of the section 
is the same, it is referred to as section 59-12-104(15) (Supp 1993) 
in Mt Olvmpus. Here, the Respondent will adopt this Court's 
nomenclature and refer to the section by its prior number, 59-12-
104(16). 
2 
The Respondent asserts that this Court needs to overturn the 
Mt> Olvmpus dicta, and recognize the express and explicit grants 
of discretion in the exemption statute. Then, given that 
standard of review (See Section B - Deference Must Be Granted To 
The Tax Commission's Rule below), the Court must grant deference 
to the Commission's interpretation of the statute and affirm 
unless the Commission's interpretation is "unreasonable." Morton 
Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 592 (Utah, 1991). The 
Court's opinion errs in failing to recognize and apply the proper 
standard of review. 
B. Deference Must Be Granted To The Tax 
Commission's Rule. 
The Court fails to apply the appropriate standard of review 
to its analysis of Utah Admin. R. R865-19-85S.A.3 (1994). The 
statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (16), grants 
explicit deference to the Commission to define "new or expanding 
operations." (See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) above). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) require the Court to 
give deference to the Commission where an explicit grant of 
discretion exists: 
59-1-610. Standard of review of appellate court. 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative 
proceedings commenced before the commission, 
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
3 
(a) grant the commission deference 
concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard on 
review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is 
an explicit grant of discretion contained in 
a statute at issue before the appellate 
court. 
The Court erred in not giving deference to the Commission's 
definition of "new or expanding.M The Court may set aside a rule 
which is inconsistent with the governing statute• But, in 
reviewing a rule drafted pursuant to a direct legislative 
mandate, that rule should be viewed as a delegation of 
legislative power. In stating "The Commission shall define by 
rule, . . . " the legislature has delegation of power to define 
that term to the Commission. The exercise of that express 
delegated power should be reviewed only to determine if it goes 
beyond the legislature's delegation of authority. Where the 
legislature has given express direction to the Commission to 
define a term, the Commission's definition should be reviewed for 
reasonableness. In determining whether the definition is 
reasonable, the Court must also consider that exemption statutes 
are to be narrowly construed.2 Thus construing or defining the 
2
 Parsons Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 
397 (Utah 1990). 
4 
terms narrowly is not only reasonablef but proper. If the 
Commission's Rule is reasonable it must be viewed as a proper 
exercise of the power specifically delegated to the Commission by 
the legislature to define the term in question. The Court erred 
in not deferring to the Commission's exercise of the 
legislature's mandate to define specific terms and in reviewing 
the Commission's actions as if no express grant of discretion was 
made. 
An administrative rule may go beyond the statute where it 
attempts to redefine terms already defined by the legislature. 
However, where a term is undefined by statute, and the statute 
contains not only an express grant of discretion, but specific 
instructions to define a term, that definition should be imbued 
with a presumption of correctness and be upheld unless 
unreasonable on its face. 
In applying the standard of review in this case, the Court 
committed error in, first, not giving deference to the 
Commission's conclusions of law that the equipment and machinery 
were "normal operating replacements," and second, in not granting 
deference to the Commission's definition of "new or expanding 
operations" when the legislature has specifically delegated the 
defining of those terms to the Commission in the tax exemption 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) require that 
5 
the Court give deference to the Commission and review those 
determinations for "reasonableness." See Morton, at 586. 
II. THE COURT FAILED TO INTERPRET AND APPLY THE EXEMPTION 
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-12-104(16), WHICH BY ITS 
CLEAR LANGUAGE SPECIFICALLY DISQUALIFIES REPLACEMENT 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. 
Even if there were no legislative mandate that the Tax 
Commission define "new or expanding operations," and even if the 
Court were not required to give deference to the Commission's 
interpretation of the statute, the Court's opinion is inadequate 
since the Court failed to complete the analysis and application 
of the exemption statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) with 
regard to replacement equipment. The statute in pertinent part 
reads: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and eguipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. 
The Court abruptly ends the opinion without regard to the 
limitation in the statute that normal operating replacements 
cannot qualify for the exemption (even .if. they fall within the 
definition of "new or expanding"). The entire exemption statute 
needs to be addressed by the Court, not just the first phrase. 
6 
The statute sets forth five conditions for procuring the 
exemption, all five of which must be met to qualify: 
1. The items purchased or leased must be machinery or 
equipment; 
2. The purchaser must be a manufacturer, as described 
within SIC Codes 2000-3999; 
3. The equipment or machinery must be used in a 
manufacturing facility in Utah; 
4. The items must be for use in a "new or expanding 
operation"; and 
5. The items must not be "normal operating 
replacements." 
The penultimate sentence of the analysis portion of the 
Court's opinion states, "Based on the Commission's findings and 
the plain meaning of section 59-12-104(16), NAC met its burden of 
demonstrating that it was a 'new or expanding operation!].'" The 
Court then skips the next logical step of examining the remainder 
of § 59-12-104(16) and jumps to the conclusion that NAC is 
entitled to the exemption. 
After the administrative rule is set aside the Court never 
returns to the statute to analyze whether the decision of the 
Commission was inconsistent with the statute itself. The Court 
needs to review the facts, as found by the Commission, to 
determine if the Petitioner has met all of the statutory 
requirements to qualify for the exemption. Being a "new and 
expanding operation" is just one of those requirements. The 
7 
Legislature, in the statutory language chose to exclude "normal 
operating replacements, •' even iJL those requirements "increased 
production or capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). This 
limitation is set by the Legislature, not by the Commission. 
Therefore, even iJE Petitioner's plant was a "new and expanding 
operation" its equipment would not qualify if it were replacement 
equipment, "as determined by the Commission." Even in footnote 
3, p. 9 of the Opinion, the Court concludes, "As the Commission's 
findings indicate, NAC replaced its equipment and machinery for 
the express purpose of expanding its operation and capabilities." 
(emphasis added). 
The Commission found, "NAC's new offset presses and 
auxiliary equipment were placed in a plant that had previously 
consisted of an offset press and two letter presses. While the 
new offset presses and supporting equipment offer superior 
quality and greater capacity than the old letter presses, the 
basic purpose and actual use of both types of presses is the 
same: they produce daily newspapers." (Record, p.33.) By its 
plain language, the statute says that normal operating 
replacements will not qualify for the tax exemption. The Court's 
opinion does not deal with this statutory requirement. It 
wrongly assumes that if Petitioner is a "new and expanding 
operation," that all of its equipment qualifies. That assumption 
8 
ignores the language of the statute which sets five pre-
requisites for qualification, all of which must be met before 
Petitioner is entitled to the exemption. The Court's opinion 
stops short of analyzing whether petitioner meets all of the 
statutory requirements, regardless of the standard the Court uses 
in making its analysis, 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must first identify, then apply the proper 
standard of review. That standard, set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-610, requires the Court to give deference to the agency, 
and review its decision for reasonableness where, as here, there 
exits an express grant of discretion. Whether or not this Court 
chooses to ignore the legislative mandate that the Commission 
define terms by rule, the Court must still determine whether 
Petitioner has meet all of the statutory requirements for the 
exemption. In so doing, it must narrowly construe the exemption. 
The Court's Opinion fails to undertake this analysis, and in so 
doing, proves inadequate for a proper resolution of this case. 
Wherefore the Utah State Tax Commission respectfully requests 
that the Court grant this Motion for Rehearing. 
9 
DATED this <£/- clay of March, 1995. 
GALE K. FRANCIS /' 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
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